a role in the Baltic economies? by Mygind, Niels
CEES 
 
Working Paper No. 66             March 2007 
 
Employee ownership – a role in the Baltic economies?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Niels Mygind 
nm.cees@cbs.dk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for East European Studies 
Department of International Economics and Management 
 
Copenhagen Business School 
Porcelænshaven 24  
Dk-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark 
Tel + 45 3815 2515    Fax + 45 3815 2500 
 2
Employee ownership – a role in the Baltic economies?       
Niels Mygind, Copenhagen Business School  
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This paper gives an overview over some theory and empirical evidence on employee 
ownership and other forms of employee financial participation and answers the following questions: 
What is employee ownership and what is the relation to other forms of financial participation? 
Why is employee ownership widespread in some developed market economies like US and in Italy, 
France and Spain, while it has a quite rare occurrence in the Scandinavian countries? 
What are the conditions favouring and what are the barriers for employee ownership?  
What are the advantages and drawbacks for employee owned companies? 
The paper also gives a summary of the experience in the Baltics – with reference to the following 
three country articles – and gives finally some perspectives for the future. 
Methodology/approach: This is a general review article on theory and some of the main empirical 
research results on employee financial participation.  
Findings: It is predicted that employee ownership will be found in organizations which are small, 
homogenous, labor intensive, and with high emphasis on human capital. Employee ownership can 
have positive effects on labour productivity, but financial constraints may make a barrier for in-
vestment and restructuring. Legislation with tax incentives, rules for selling and buying employee 
shares, access to loans change the balance in favor of employee financial participation. In the Baltic 
countries there was a wave of employee ownership following early privatization. However, these 
firms soon were taken over by managers and often later by outside owners. Profit sharing is rare and 
there is no legislation promoting employee participation in the management bodies of companies.  
Implications: Legislation following the trend in EU could promote a revival of employee financial 
participation and strengthen motivation and productivity especially in knowledge based companies.  
Value of the paper: A short overview over the main theoretical predictions and empirical findings 
on employee financial participation and on the development in the Baltic countries. 
Keywords: employee participation, employee ownership, profit sharing, labour motivation, labour 
productivity. 
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1. Introduction 
Employee ownership has been quite widespread in all the three Baltic economies in connection with 
the privatization process. But the experience has been rather short-lived since in most of the em-
ployee owned companies the majority of shares have been transferred to managers and in some 
cases to core outside investors or foreign investors. The experience has shown that the conditions 
were not ready for this type of ownership and the potential of high employee motivation and in-
creased productivity have not yet been exploited. However, in the most developed economies in EU 
and in US different forms of employee financial participation has a quite strong presence as part of 
the business model for using the high potential of human capital. 
 
In this article I will first give a short introduction to the different forms of employee participation. 
Then the conditions favoring or hampering the spread of employee participation will be discussed 
both from a theoretical side and from empirical evidence from the West. This leads to an analysis of 
the possible effect of employee participation, again supplemented by a discussion of the evidence, 
here, from both East and West. Finally, the experience from the transition countries in Eastern 
Europe will be discussed. The focus will be on the three Baltic countries and with most weight on 
employee ownership since this type of employee participation has by far been the most important in 
these countries.  
 
Different types of employee participation 
Employee participation can take several forms which all related to the ownership rights of the com-
pany. There are three fundamental ownership rights: the right to control, the right to the surplus 
from the activities of the company and the right to the accumulated net assets of the company. The 
shareholders get typically a share of all these three rights. However, there could be limitations on 
some shares bearing only little or no right to voting at the general assembly, and sometimes the 
power of minority shareholders are so limited that the right to control is negligible. There can also 
be some rights to control without financial rights. In countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Germany 
and Holland the employees are by law eligible to some of the seats in the boards of joint stock com-
panies of a certain size. They can cote in the company board, but have no other ownership rights. 
There are also examples of profit-sharing, where employees get a certain share of the profits, but 
have no shares and no votes at the general assembly. Sometimes, profit-sharing is connected to buy-
ing/transferring shares of the company and then gradually increasing the ownership of the employ-
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ees. In this way there are many possible combinations and types. Table I gives an overview over the 
main forms of employee participation. 
 
Table I.  Different forms of employee participation. 
Type                                                     right to: Control surplus Wealth 
Majority employee ownership + + + 
Minority employee ownership Limited + + 
Profit sharing 0 + 0 
Non controlling ESOP 0 + + 
Worker cooperatives + + limited 
Representation in the company board + 0 0 
 
In some countries there are special employee ownership schemes giving support through taxes, sub-
sidies or other advantages with incentives to transfer ownership to employees, e.g. the US legisla-
tion for ESOPs (Employee Stock Ownership Plans) or the French support of profit sharing in com-
bination with accumulation of employee shares (Uvalic, 2006). In the US ESOP a thrust fund, often 
leveraged by loans, takes over shares (often majority) of the company and these are gradually trans-
ferred to the workers through profit sharing. The system has benefited from tax advantages and 
covers now 8.8 millions or about 6% of the workforce in US. In most cases the votes are not di-
rectly controlled by the workers, but by trustees of the fund - marked by zero control in table I. 
However, there are several thousand companies with majority employee control (Rosen et al, 2005). 
 
Worker cooperatives are often defined in relation to traditional cooperative principles of one vote 
per member and open membership. In the case of a worker cooperative it means that only workers 
are members and they have equal say at the general meeting. There are mechanisms for enrolling 
new employees as members and for exiting members transferring their ownership back to the coop-
erative. The value, a member gets, when leaving is in most cases restricted - they only have owner-
ship right to a limited part of the accumulated wealth in the company. This is often referred to as 
collective ownership (Mygind, 1987) in contrast to the most widespread situation of employee own-
ership in Eastern Europe where employees own individual shares which can be sold in principle for 
the market value. This distinction has some important consequences for the theoretical predictions 
about the behavior of the two types of ownership. 
 5
 
Conditions favoring and hampering employee ownership 
In Western industrialized countries employee ownership is not widespread although there are some 
exceptions like the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain, the worker cooperatives connected to the 
Lega in Northern Italy, or ESOPs in US. It may surprise that employee owned enterprises are rare in 
the Scandinavian welfare states shaped by strong unions and Social Democratic parties. The agenda 
from the 1970s of development of Economic Democracy has not evolved into employee ownership. 
Instead wage-earners’ pension funds like in all developed economies play an increasing role as 
owners of enterprises. Why is employee ownership most widespread in some developed market 
economies like US and in Italy, France and Spain, while it is quite rare in Scandinavia? What are 
the conditions favouring and what are the barriers for employee ownership? In which sectors of the 
economy are they expected to develop? 
 
The rarity of employee ownership is not because of inferior incentives. On the contrary most studies 
show that employee owned enterprises mean higher motivation and productivity (Blinder, 1990). 
However, they have often problems in relation to attracting capital and the functioning of a market 
for individual employee shares. Dow (2003) finds the basic difference in comparison with the 
dominant capitalist firm in relation to the inalienability of labor in contrast to the situation for capi-
tal. Employee owned firms have a commitment problem in relation to external capital inputs, a 
composition problem in relation to the collective decision making by the employee owners and a 
commodification problem in relation to trading employee shares.  
 
The conditions favoring or hampering employee financial participation are related to a broad spec-
ter of factors: institutions, culture, technology and socio-economic conditions. These conditions will 
in the following be presented on three levels: individual, company and society. 
 
At the individual level cultural and socio-economic conditions play a decisive role: Are the employ-
ees motivated to take over their companies and do they have the necessary capital to do this?  
It is important that the employees have a desire for self-governance – a desire to participate in deci-
sions. At the same time some collective culture may ease the process of decision making in the 
group of employees. A collective culture dominated by a collective wage-earner attitude accepting 
that control resides at the capitalist owner will, however, not give any push for employee owner-
ship. It is not enough with a desire for being part of decision making. The employees must have the 
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necessary skills, the education and the ability to go into this process. They must also be willing to 
offer the effort and time for going into the decision processes, which in a democratic employee 
owned company may be quite demanding. Employee owners can thus be expected to be found, es-
pecially among the higher educated and more experienced employees. In knowledge based compa-
nies the highly educated employees often have better access to the necessary information to monitor 
the managers than it is the case for external capital investors. 
 
Personal wealth of the employees plays an important role when a considerable down-payment is 
needed for ownership. Wealthy employees can afford this contribution without concentrating a high 
proportion of their wealth in the same venture where they have also invested their human capital. 
This concentration of risk must be seen in combination with the individual preferences, the degree 
of risk-aversion, and the capital problem discussed below in relation to the company level. Risking 
both the job and a high proportion of personal wealth is like putting all the eggs in one basket as 
pointed out by Meade (1972) and Putterman (1993). The risk connected to losing the job and losing 
specific human capital is an important element determining the value of employee ownership (Blair, 
1995). The costs of lost specific human capital will be included with extra weight in the decision 
process in the employee owned firm compared to the situation in the traditional firm. 
 
The cost of losing the job also depends on the individual mobility. The cost is very high for a well 
established employee with family, house etc. who could not move to another location without con-
siderable costs. This can be contrasted to young mobile employees who frequently shift between 
different enterprises to collect experience and who are not bonded by family obligations and high 
investments in the local area. Therefore, macro variables such as alternative local employment pos-
sibilities play an important role for the weight an employee puts on the mobility factor. This in-
cludes also the level of unemployment benefits and the social safety at the level of society. 
 
At the company level the problem of collective decision making and the free rider problem increase 
with bigger firm size, with increasing heterogeneity of the labor force and in general with higher 
complexity of the employee-owned organization. This is what Dow (2003) calls the composition 
problem of the controlling owner group. He compares with the capitalist firm where the group of 
owners often is smaller and owners often have parallel interests. Hansmann (1988 and 1996) em-
phasizes the problem of decision making in a heterogeneous group of employees where e.g. un-
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skilled workers may have conflicting interests with the group of highly skilled professional workers. 
This type of conflict was found in a case study at the Danish employee owned newspaper Informa-
tion (Westenholz and Mygind, 1982). Here, conflicts between printing workers and journalists were 
behind the demise of employee ownership. Thus, the typical employee owned company will be rela-
tively small with a quite homogenous labor-force. If the labor force is heterogeneous ownership 
may be limited to a smaller homogeneous group of managers and specialists. In the West we find a 
high frequency of partnerships where key employees are the dominant owners in sectors such as IT, 
consultants, lawyer companies and other professional services.  
 
Knowledge based companies have a high dependency on human capital. Some of this human capital 
may be firm-specific and can not be used in another company. The employees need extra incentives 
to invest time for training and developing these specific skills. They run the risk of losing this hu-
man capital if they have to change to another company. There is mutual dependence between the 
employees and the company – a dependency which makes employee ownership an obvious solu-
tion. However, in a heterogeneous group with varying human capital between the employees only 
some of them may become owners.  
 
Teamwork, empowerment of employees, modern HRM-techniques etc. are ways to involve the em-
ployees for higher effort and investing specific human capital into the firm. It may involve part of 
the package of employee ownership in the form of different forms of financial participation, profit 
sharing, stock options etc, or in the form of participation in some decisions (Kaarsemaker and Pout-
sma, 2006). It could be an advantageous strategy for the capital owners to introduce some elements 
of employee participation and ripping some of the benefits of employee ownership without giving 
up the ultimate control. According to Dow (2003), however, without full employee ownership there 
would be a commitment problem now in disfavor of capital ownership. Still, it could be assumed 
that a management style with a high degree of employee participation like in the typical Scandina-
vian company may decrease the pressure for real employee ownership. 
 
The finance problem connected to high capital intensity is a classical problem in the literature on 
employee owned firms (Vanek, 1971; Meade, 1972; Putterman, 1988).  High capital intensity, high 
assets per worker, means that the capital cost per employee is very high and in most cases beyond 
the possibilities of the average employee. At the same time there is a commitment problem (Dow, 
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2003) for attracting external capital both as bank loans and as non-controlling equity because there 
may be conflict of goals between the employee owners and the external capital. Thus, the theory 
predicts low capital intensity in employee owned enterprises. Evidence both for Western and East-
ern Europe shows that banks are reluctant to lend money to employee owned companies. This is 
confirmed by most Western experience except for Mondragon (Dow, 2003). Mondragon is also the 
exception in relation to financial constraints on bank loans: By having a strong bank as the financial 
center of the group Mondragon companies have been able to overcome the important financial con-
straint barrier for employee owned companies. Combined with accumulating individual employee-
accounts this had made it possible for the Mondragon cooperatives to expand in sectors with high 
capital intensity (Thomas and Logan, 1982; Whyte and Whyte, 1991). 
 
The conditions at the individual and at the company level interact with the conditions at the society 
level. The individual choice of employee ownership depends on the possibilities for finding satisfac-
tory working conditions on the labor market. These conditions are determined by the economic de-
velopment in the given country, legislation and the role and strength of the unions. In economic 
downturns with high unemployment the job alternatives are few and unsatisfactory giving pressure 
for more employee ownership including defensive takeovers of companies about to close down.  
 
There is a substitution effect between favorable market conditions for labor with good employment 
possibilities and a security system in case of unemployment on one side and the need of employee 
ownership on the other side as an alternative if the labor market shows high uncertainty and few 
opportunities for employees. Therefore, strong unions and a high support level for employees can 
limit the pressure for employee ownership. Codetermination with obligatory seats for employee in 
the boards of stock companies and in general a participatory management style can have the same 
effect – the employees have influence, so why bother with direct ownership?  
 
The situation in Denmark gives an interesting illustration of how different legislative element and a 
strong labor movement have improved mobility and the protection of labor so the wage-earner 
situation is favorable. Therefore, employees have not sought the alternative as employee-owners to 
improve their situation. The Danish social security system with high and long lasting unemploy-
ment benefits have made redundancy less threatening. At the same time there are very few thresh-
olds for firing workers. This high degree of flexibility combined with high social security is thus 
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named “flexicurity”. The organization of work is characterized by a flat organizational structure 
with high degree of participation and empowerment of employees. Unions are strong and workers 
have a high union-membership rate. Even in periods of high unemployment as in the 1980s there 
was no movement for establishing employee owned companies in Denmark. By law employees 
have one third of the seats in the company board of joint stock companies with more than 50 em-
ployees. Except for this and some tax-advantages for minority employee shares there are no legisla-
tive support for employee participation. Majority employee ownership is only found in professional 
partnerships, legal firms, architects, IT-companies etc., but here it is typically only leading and core 
employees who are owners. On the other hand some of the larger companies have minority em-
ployee ownership, and although the employee shares only make up a few percentages of the total 
share capital the value of the shares sometimes make up a considerable amount for the individual 
employee and in this way it can contribute to the incentives for these employees giving high identi-
fication with the company. 
 
In contrast to Scandinavia much more employee ownership is found in Southern Europe and US 
with higher uncertainty for the workers on the labor market. The explanation for the different types 
of employee ownership in countries such as Italy, Spain and France mostly in the form of worker 
cooperatives are also connected to special treatment in legislation related to cooperatives or in US 
in relation to ESOPs with important tax advantages and institutional structures that helps the sus-
tainability of these types of employee ownership. In Scandinavia such favorable institutional rules 
are only found in a few specific sectors such as some social services in Sweden (Pestoff, 2000).  
 
Effects of employee participation - advantages and drawbacks of employee ownership 
There are many theories and comprehensive analyses of evidence of the effects of different forms of 
employee financial participation. Still, in many areas there are no clear conclusions because the 
analysis is very complex with many different elements playing a role for company performance.  
 
Most authors agree on the positive alignment and incentive effects of different forms of employee 
participation. In the traditional capitalist firm there is a commitment problem between labor and 
capital. Although different human resource management tools can be exploited to increase the in-
centives of employees the ultimate tool is to overcome the distinction between owner and employee 
(Dow, 2003). Closely related to the productivity effects the theory predicts a lower turnover of the 
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employees because of the higher motivation and because employee ownership is more likely to be 
found in firms with high investment in specific human capital. In a meta-study combining the re-
sults of 26 econometric empirical studies Kruse (1993) finds strong support for a positive relation 
between productivity and profit-sharing. These results are also confirmed by Perotin and Robinson 
(2003). They stress that studies from more than 20 countries covering several tens of thousands of 
enterprises agree that financial participation has a positive or neutral effect on productivity, and 
schemes that offer a larger financial involvement have higher productivity effects. They find that 
cash profit-sharing schemes seem to have a short-term effect, whereas share schemes, which are 
more long-term oriented, seem to have a more sustained effect. Many studies point in the direction 
that the combination of financial participation in the company results and well informed employees 
active participating in decision making give the highest effect on labor productivity (Kruse and 
Blasi, 1997). Conte and Svejnar (1990) finds mixed results for ESOPs and concludes that they do 
not mean lower productivity. For cooperatives they find increasing productivity. In a review of the 
empirical evidence for transition economies Jones (2004) finds that employee ownership either have 
a neutral or positive effect on productivity. 
 
The direct connection to the company results e.g. in the form of profit sharing (Weitzman, 1984) or 
the form of employee ownership is predicted to give more flexibility in wage settlements. Employ-
ees are willing to accept lower wages because they get a share in the results of the company. This 
also leads to the prediction that employment will be more stable and income for the employees 
more volatile in companies with employee financial participation. In their review Perotin and Rob-
inson (2003) find little evidence for the stability of employment, however they find some indication 
that profit-sharing firms may respond less to downward demand shocks and more to upward shocks 
than other firms. 
 
The classical theory of labor management in the form of “Illyrian firm” based on the Yugoslav 
model (Ward, 1958), and further developed by Vanek (1970),  states that this type of collectively 
employee owned firm maximizing the average income per labor has some “perverse” short run ad-
justment in the form of a negatively sloped supply curve. This theory, however, has quite restrictive 
assumptions including collective ownership where employee owners cannot recuperate capital 
gains. By relaxing these assumptions and/or by assuming individual ownership the goal of the em-
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ployees align with maximizing profits. Furthermore, this Illyrian theory has been contradicted by 
the empirical results (Sertel, 1982; Mygind, 1987).  
 
If the employees cannot get capital gains there is also less incentive to invest in the company be-
yond the time where the employee expect to leave the company (Vanek, 1971). This can again be 
solved by individual ownership. However, the newer theory (Dow, 2003) related to the lack of 
commitment from external capital suppliers e.g. banks because they assume that employee owned 
companies will follow other goals than profit maximization, lead to financial constraints which 
again can explain lower investment levels in employee owned companies. This is actually con-
firmed in several studies including those for East European companies (Mygind, 2000).  Lack of 
capital may also indicate that this type of companies will not be able to restructure so deeply. Stud-
ies on Estonian firms confirm to some extent this tendency, but the contrast to other kinds of firms 
is only significant in relation to foreign owned enterprises (Hobdari, 2003).  
 
The experience of employee financial participation in the Baltics  
The experience with employee financial participation has in the Baltic countries been dominated by 
employee ownership in relation to the privatization process. However, these often majority em-
ployee owned enterprises were in later stages often transferred to other majority owners sometimes 
leaving some employees with minority shares. Other forms of employee participation such as profit 
sharing has only limited prevalence and participation of employees in the company board without 
formal ownership have not been on the agenda except in a very recent discussion related to Euro-
pean Companies defined by EU rules, but this phenomenon has only marginal importance in the 
Baltic countries. 
 
The first elements of employee ownership were related to the early Soviet reforms during the Gor-
batjov period. The “new cooperatives” started up in the late 1980s were a preliminary form of em-
ployee majority ownership. Formally the entrepreneurs starting up these new businesses – restau-
rants, small shops, personal services etc. – had to share the ownership with the employees. Later, 
when it became legally possible the managers often took over the full ownership. Leasing by the 
worker collective was also a way to transfer smaller enterprises or a part of a larger enterprise to the 
employees. Later in the process employees and/or managers used the option to buy these enter-
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prises. These early private companies had the highest frequency in the Baltic countries compared to 
other parts of the Soviet Union (Frydman et al, 1993). 
 
After getting independence the Baltic countries developed their own specific forms of privatization. 
An important distinguishing factor was the existence of a large group of Russian speaking employ-
ees in Estonia and Latvia. Here, the national question dominated politics in the early years and was 
an important explanation why the early laws for small privatization with high advantages for em-
ployees quite soon was changed and the favourable treatment of employees were abolished. In 
Lithuania, on the contrary, the support for employee takeovers increased in the early years after 
independence and the first and largest wave of privatization in Lithuania gave strong advantages to 
the employees resulting in a quite high number of majority employee owned enterprises also in 
quite large and capital intensive enterprises (Mygind, 2000). The advantages for employee were 
taken away in 1992-93 in Estonia and Latvia while in Lithuania they endured to the summer 1995. 
 
In most cases in Eastern Europe including the Baltic countries employee ownership was established 
through individual share ownership. There was no direct link between the job contract and owner-
ship. The employees got individual shares through the privatization process at discounted prices. 
However, for new workers entering the firm at later stages there were no automatic offering of 
cheap shares. Likewise, for leaving employees there was no obligation to sell. Therefore, changes in 
the workforce meant strong tendencies in the direction of diluting the proportion of owners among 
the employees (Kalmi, 2002). In the first years of transition with inflation eating up the savings and 
the real wages of most employees this liquidity constraint was an important reason for fast sale of 
employee shares after privatization. Furthermore, there was a serious commodification problem 
(Dow, 2003) with no well-functioning market for employee shares and no mechanism for a fair 
valuation at exit. Thus, these shares were mostly sold at undervalued prices because the employees 
had no information about the real value and because the managers who often were the buyers con-
trolled the process of buying and selling shares (Mygind and Kalmi, 2006).  
 
Another exit route for an employee owned company could be related to the lack of sources for ex-
ternal capital. The evidence shows bank loans to be most restricted for employee owned companies 
(Mygind, 2000). Because of the reluctance of banks and external minority investors, especially, 
employee owned companies did not get the necessary funds for investments. Instead, an external 
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investor with the necessary capital took over the majority of shares and took control with the com-
pany. Such takeovers also happened in successful employee owned companies where the employee 
owners because of the high value of the company got offers to good to decline (Mygind and Kalmi, 
2006). Therefore, a frequent ownership cycle in the Baltics was observed to be: first employee own-
ership followed by management takeover and then ending up with outside external ownership often 
by foreigners (Jones and Mygind, 2006) 
 
Exit of companies is frequent in a dynamic economy. The problem for employee ownership, espe-
cially, in the transitional economies, was that nearly no new employee owned enterprises were 
started. The development of the number of employee owned companies can be characterized by a 
ratchet effect with a lot of majority employee owned companies started in relation to privatization, 
but when they over time closed down or were taken over by other owner-groups there were no or 
very few new-coming employee owned companies to fill the holes. 
 
Companies are often started up as greenfield or spin-offs by a small group of employees. If em-
ployee ownership is not part of the founding idea, but only an instrument to realize a certain busi-
ness opportunity, the successful growth of the company means that the ownership stay concentrated 
in the hands of a few founders and does not include new-coming employees. Only in cases where 
such new companies are institutionally bonded by rules demanding that all employees are offered 
the possibility to join like in the US ESOPs it can be expected that employee ownership is sustain-
able. However, the favorable institutional setting for employee ownership in the Baltics was limited 
to the early privatization process. Later in the process the advantages for employees were abolished 
and there were no institutional rules to support employee ownership by facilitating entry and exit of 
employee owners and by developing a structure for external finance (Mygind, 2000).  
 
Manager surveys done in all the three Baltic countries (Mygind, 2002abc) show that profit-sharing 
was only found in very few enterprises in the end of the 1990. Case evidence shows, however, that 
it has probably increased in the later years as one of the tools to try to keep the employees in the 
company and in the country, avoiding migration to one of the old EU countries like Denmark, UK 
or Ireland. Migration of some of the young highly educated workers has been an increasing prob-
lem, especially in Lithuania in the later years. Some case evidence collected in the research project 
behind the following country articles also point to examples of large companies where minority 
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employee shares are used as a way to motivate employees. However, it was difficult to find profes-
sional companies, lawyers, architects etc. with ownership by the group of core employees.  
 
Conclusion and some perspectives for the future. 
Different forms of employee financial participation are now more widespread in the old EU coun-
tries than it is the case in the new member states. Also in US employee ownership play an important 
role as part of the explanation of highly motivated employees and strong developments in labor 
productivity, especially in sectors with high knowledge intensity.  
 
In many of the new member states including the Baltic countries we have seen a boom in employee 
majority owned enterprises in relation to the privatization process. This was especially the case in 
Lithuania where the large privatization favored employee takeovers and opened for majority em-
ployee ownership also in large and capital intensive companies, while employee ownership in Esto-
nia and Latvia was connected to the privatization of small enterprises and leasing of a group of me-
dium sized enterprises. However, it seems that the introduction of employee ownership happened at 
a stage when the three Baltic countries were not ready to exploit the potential of employee financial 
participation. There were no institutions to value the employee shares and to facilitate trading at fair 
prices; there were no regulation for giving new coming employees the opportunity to buy employee 
shares; most employees were in strong need of extra money to cover the losses of steeply falling 
real wages in the first years of transition; the employees were not included actively into the decision 
process. Managers were in a strong position to take over the employee shares at very low prices. 
Thus, most majority employee-owned enterprises changed to manager ownership and often to the 
next stage in the governance cycle to outside domestic or foreign ownership.  
 
Furthermore, there was a change in policy towards employee financial participation. In Estonia and 
Latvia the advantages for employees in privatization only covered the very first years of small pri-
vatization. In Lithuania the change came later after the end of the first big wave of privatization in 
the summer of 1995. Since then there were no legislation or initiatives promoting employee owner-
ship or other forms of employee financial participation. This meant except for a few cases other 
forms of employee participation such as profit-sharing has never developed in the Baltic countries. 
Employee ownership turned out to be a temporary phenomenon. From being in the front in EU in 
relation to employee financial participation the three Baltic countries are now in the low ranks. 
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However, there are some new tendencies that may change the situation. First, after the steep fall in 
GDP in the first years of transition the Baltic economies are now fast catching up showing the high-
est growth rates in Europe. This means steeply increasing real wages and wealth of the employees. 
Pension systems are being built up, and it starts to be realistic to assume that employee shares can 
be part of the increasing savings. Secondly, foreign companies are bringing their systems for moti-
vating employees to the Baltics. This includes minority employee shares, profit sharing and other 
types of employee financial participation. Thirdly, the increasing level of production, the increasing 
weight on knowledge based production means higher emphasis on human capital and more room 
for and effect of different forms of employee financial participation. Fourthly, as documented in the 
earlier PEPPER Reports employee financial participation are developing in many of the old EU 
countries and EU is recommending and promoting different schemes. Therefore, it can be expected 
that the three countries in the future to a much higher degree will start to exploit the potential of 
employee financial participation. 
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